The Power of the State to Control the Use of Its Natural Resources by Williams, Dwight




The Power of the State to Control the Use of Its
Natural Resources
Dwight Williams
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Dwight, "The Power of the State to Control the Use of Its Natural Resources" (1927). Minnesota Law Review. 1172.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1172
STATE CONTROL OF NATURAL RESOURCES
THE POWER OF THE STATE TO CONTROL THE USE
OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES-
By DWIGHT WILLIAMS*
THE EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE STATE TO CONTROL IXDE-
PENDENT OF ITS PROPRIETARY INTEREST
H ITHERTO we have considered the power of the state over its
natural resources only as that power is derived from
its proprietary capacity. In a broad sense the police power of
the state includes the power the state thus exercises as a trustee.
In the present installment we are to examine the extent of the
police power of the state in the narrower sense over natural
resources, that is, independent of its character as trustee.
1. As AGAINST PRIVATE RIGHTS.
The power of the state over wild animals both as against the
claims of individuals and as against the charge of regulating
interstate commerce which was upheld in the case of Geer v.
Connecticut 5 by reason of its proprietary interest can also be
based on the general police power of the state. The United
States Supreme Court in the last paragraph of its opinion in the
Geer Case said:
"Aside from the authority of the state, derived from the com-
mon ownership of game and the trust for the benefit of its people
which the state exercises in relation thereto, there is another view
of the power of the state in regard to the property in game, which
is equally conclusive. The right to preserve game flows from the
undoubted existence in the state of a police power to that end,
which may be none the less efficiently called into play, because by
doing so interstate commerce may be remotely and indirectly
affected."
But there are enactments in connection with the regulation of
the taking of wild animals which cannot be derived from the
proprietary interest of the state and to be sustained must be based
on the police power. A game law of New York provided that,
*Professor of Business Law, Kansas State Agricultural College, Man-
hattan, Kansas.
tFor the first installment of this article, see 11 MINNESOTA LAW
REvimv 129-49.
75(1896) 161 U. S. 519, 16 Sup. Ct. 600, 40 L. Ed. 793.
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"whenever in this act the possession of fish or game, or the
flesh of any animal, bird or fish is prohibited, reference is had
equally to such fish, game or flesh coming from without the state
as to that taken within the state."
Obviously the state can have no proprietary interest in game and
fish reduced to possession outside the state and brought in. The
validity of the provision of the New York law was upheld as a
proper exercise of the police power by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg70
Silz was convicted of violating the statute by having in his
possession in the state in the closed season two birds both lawffully
taken and killed in Europe. He sought release by a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. The United States Supreme Court
said :7
"It has been provided that the possession of certain kinds of
game during the closed season shall be prohibited, owing to the
possibility that dealers in game may sell birds of the domestic
kind under the claim that they were taken in another state or
country. The object of such laws is not to affect the legality of
the taking of game in other states, but to protect the local game
in the interest of the food supply of the people of the state. We
cannot say that such purpose, frequently recognized and acted
upon, is an abuse of the police power of the state, and as such
to be declared void because contrary to the fourteenth amendment
of the constitution. 78
As the power of the state over wild animals has been based
on the police power independently of the trusteeship of the state,
the same has been done with reference to its power over water.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter," in an opinion written by Justice Holmes
said :80
"But we prefer to put the authority, which cannot be denied
to the state, upon a broader ground than that which was empha-
76(1908) 211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75.
77New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, (1908) 211 U. S. 31, 40, 29
Sup. Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75.78The case affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals of New York
in People, ex rel. Hill v. Hesterberg, (1906) 184 N. Y. 126, 76 N. E.
1032, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 163. State courts had previously upheld such
laws. Ex parte Maler, (1894) 103 Cal. 476, 37 Pac. 402; Magner v. Illinois,
(1881) 97 Ill. 320: Phelps v. Racey, (1875) 60 N. Y. 10, 19 Am. Rep. 140.
To the contrary, however, is the case of In re Davenport, C. C. D. Wash.
(1900) 102 Fed. 540.
79(1908) 209 U. S. 349, 28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828, 14 Ann. Cas.
560.
8OHudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, (1908) 209 U. S. 349, 355,
28 Sup. Ct. 529, 52 L. Ed. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 560.
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sized below, since, in our opinion, it is independent of the more
or less attenuated residuum of title that the state may be said to
possess."
This broader ground was expounded in the following lan-
guage :81
"It appears to us that few public interests are more obvious,
indisputable, and independent of particular theory than the inter-
est of the public of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly
within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon
them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public
interest is omnipresent wherever there is a state, and grows more
pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of
opinion that the private property of riparian proprietors cannot
be supposed to have deeper roots. Whether it be said that such
an interest justifies the cutting down by statute, without compen-
sation, in the exercise of the police power, of what otherwise
would be private rights of property, or that apart from statute
those rights do not go to the height of what the defendant seeks
to do, the result is the same."
We have already noted that the property rights in subter-
ranean waters are on a different basis from those in waters
above ground in that the owner of the soil is according to the
earlier common law rule the absolute owner of the percolating
water and may do as he pleases with it. This rule, however, we
found has been considerably modified in many jurisdictions in
this country. The attitude of any court toward attempts on the
part of the state to regulate the use of percolating waters de-
pends on the rules at common law in its jurisdiction governing
the rights in such waters.
The case of Huber v. Merkel, 2 decided by the supreme court
of Wisconsin, is perhaps the most extreme application of the
so-called English rule in this country. The legislature of the
state provided that the owners of artesian wells "shall use due
care and diligence to prevent any loss or waste or unreasonable
use of any water therein contained or flowing from the same,
as would deprive or necessarily diminish the flow of water in
any artesian well, to the injury of the owner of any other well in
the same vicinity or neighborhood" and provided further that the
owner violating such duty should be liable in damages. The
defendant in the case was found to have maliciously allowed his
8
'Ibid. at p. 356.
82(1903) 117 Wis. 355, 94 N. W. 354, 62 L. R. A. 589.
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artesian wells to flow to their full capacity with the result that
plaintiff could not use his artesian well except by pumping the
water from it. Yet the court held that the defendant was
within his rights and that the statute was unconstitutional. "So
it seems inevitable," the court said,8 3 "that, in this state at
least, the right of a landowner to sink wells and to gather and
use percolating waters as he will, even though the flow in his
neighbor's well be diminished, is a property right." And it
concluded that84 "the law in question cannot be held to be within
the police power, and that it in effect takes private property for
private use and without compensation." '
The case of Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,80 illus-
trates, on the other hand, the attitude taken by a court that has
modified the strict English rule by limiting the rights of the
owner of the soil and recognizing correlative rights in the perco-
lating water.8 ' A statute of New York was upheld in this case
insofar as it prohibited the owner of the surface from pumping
on his own land certain mineral waters, or from taking such
waters 'by any artificial contrivance, when the object of so doing
was to extract and collect carbonic acid gas for the purpose of
marketing the same and when the result was to diminish the flow
to other owners drawing from the same source of supply. 8
The statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,"8 upon the
authority of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,0 which sustained the Indi-
ana statute against the waste of gas. In the Lindsley Case the
court said:
"The mineral waters and carbonic acid gas exist in a com-
mingled state in the underlying rock. and neither can be drawn out
8aHuber v. Merkel, (1903) 117 Wis. 355, 366, 94 N. W. 354, 62 L. R.
A. 589.
84Ibid., at p. 373.851n direct conflict with the case of Barclay v. Abraham, (1903) 121
Ia. 619, 96 N. W. 1080, 64 L. R. A. 255, and Stillwater Water Co. v
Farmer, (1903) 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W. 907, 60 L. R. A. 875, in both of
which injunctions were issued to prevent waste of the water without a
statute.
s8(1909) 194 N. Y. 326, 87 N. E. 504, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 436.
87Forbell v. City of New York, (1900) 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E. 644,
51 L. R. A. 695.
880ne member of the court dissented on the ground that the case
should be dealt with as a case of the taking of gas rather than one of
the taking of water.
89(1911) 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 55 I. Ed. 369, Ann. Cas.
1912C 160.90(1900) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729.
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without the other. They are of value in their commingled form and
also when separated, but the greater demand is for the gas alone.
Influenced by this demand, some surface owners, having wells
bored or drilled into the rock, engage in extensive pumping opera-
tions for the purpose of collecting gas and vending it as a separate
commodity. Usually where this is done an undue proportion of
the commingled Waters and gas is taken from the common supply
and a large, if not the larger, portion of the waters from which
the gas is collected is permitted to run to waste. Thus these
pumping operations generally result in an unreasonable and waste-
ful depletion of the common supply and in a corresponding injury
to others equally entitled to resort to it. It is to correct this evil
that the statute was adopted, and the remedy which it applies is
an enforced discontinuance of the excessive and wasteful features
of pumping. It does not take from any surface owner the right
to tap the underlying rock and to draw from the common supply,
but, consistently with the continued existence of that right, so
regulates its exercise as reasonably to conserve the interests of
all who possess it."
In the absence of statute, since every owner of the soil either
has a qualified ownership of the oil and gas under his land or has
the right to reduce them to possession, he may reduce to posses-
sion as rapidly as possible and fb that purpose he may use
extraordinary methods to do so. No one has the right to com-
plain for no one is deprived of a property right by the efficiency
of another in obtaining possession of the gas. Therefore the
owner of a gas well may enlarge his well by the explosion of
nitroglycerin to increase the flow.91 Likewise eaclh owner has the
right to use pumps to obtain possession of oil underneath his
property.'! But an act of the legislature making it unlawful to
pump or to increase otherwise the natural flow from a gas well
has been sustained as within the police power of the state because
it was designed to protect private property by "preventing it from
being taken by one of the common owners without regard to
the enjoyment of the others. 9 3
The chief and most successful exercise of the police power
of the state in connection with oil and gas has been in the
9
'People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, (1892) 131 Ind. 277, 31 N. E. 59, 16
L. P. A. 443.92Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., (1897) 57 Oh. St. 317, 49 N. E. 399, 30
L. R. A. 765; Higgins Oil and Fuel Co., (1919) 145 La. 234, 82 So. 206.
5 A. L R. 411.
s3Manufacturers Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas and
Oil Co., (1900) 155 Ind. 461, 57 N. E. 912, 50 L. R. A. 768. One of the
facts in the case was that the increased flow would permit salt water to
enter the gas reservoir and destroy it.
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prevention of waste. Whether independently of statute a right
exists in the owner of the soil to prevent sheer waste the courts
are not agreed. The supreme court of Pennsylvania,14 although
admitting that the public has a sufficient interest in the preserva-
tion of gas and oil from waste to justify legislation on the subject,
held that at common law the owner of land from under whose
land gas is drained and allowed to escape into the open air and go
to waste through a well on the land of a neighboring owner has
no legal remedy. The owner of the surface owns all that is
beneath and has" the right to do as he pleases with his own
property; he can sell it or destroy it. The court of appeals of
Kentucky9" has, however, held that an injunction will be issued
in such a case. The analogy of subterranean water was pointed
out and owners of the same gas reservoir, although having the
right to bore for gas, are limited to a reasonable exercise of that
right.
The leading case on the power of the state to prohibit the
waste of gas and oil is Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana9 decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1900. The legislature of Indiana
by statute made it unlawful "to allow or permit the flow of gas
or oil from any such well [i.e. natural gas or oil well] to escape
into the open air, without being confined within such well or
proper pipes or other safe receptacle, for a longer period than
two (2) days next after gas or oil shall have been struck in such
well." The Ohio Oil Co. drilled some wells in the state for the
purpose of producing oil. Oil was found and produced but some
natural gas also came to the surface from the same wells. The
company was engaged only in producing oil and had no facilities
for taking care of the gas and therefore let it escape into the
open air. It was contended that the oil could not be profitably
produced by the company from the wells without allowing the gas
to escape and that the gas served the useful purpose of forcing up
the oil. The state, through its attorney general, sought to enjoin
the company from allowing the gas to escape and an injunction
was granted in the state court. The supreme court of Indiana 1
in upholding the validity of the statute emphasized the absence
of title in any individual in gas until it was reduced to possession
94Hague v. Wheeler, (1893) 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714, 22 L. R. A. 141.95Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., (1903) 117 Ky. 71, 77
S. W. 368, 70 L. R. A. 558.
9(1899) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729.
97(1898) 150 Ind. 21, 50 N. E. 1125, 47 L. R. A. 627.
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and apparently considered that property in gas was to be put on
the same basis as property in wild animals.
When the case came before the United States Supreme Court
it had to decide whether the statute took property in violation of
the due process clause. The reply of Justice White, who wrote
the opinion of the court, to the contention that the statute was
invalid because it deprived the owners of the land of their
property in the gas itself was that if the statute was invalid for
that reason then every surface owner could drain without any
limitation whatever all gas extending under the land of others
which could be brought to his well. And such a result, he claimed,
meant that no one had property in the gas itself, for another- had
the right to take it. What each surface owner has, the court
concluded, is the right to reduce to possession and the purpose of
the statute was to protect that right.
"It follows from the essence of ,their right and from the situ-
ation of the things, as to which it can be exerted, that the use
by one of his power to seek to convert a part of the common
fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion
being attributed to one of the possessors of the right, to the
detriment of the others, or by waste by one or more, to the anni-
hilation of the rights of the remainder .... Viewed, then, as a
statute to protect or to prevent the waste of the common property
of the surface owners, the law of the State of Indiana which is
here attacked because it is asserted that it devested private
property without due compensation, in substance, is a statute pro-
tecting private property and preventing it from being taken by
one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of
the others." '
The statute involved in the Ohio Oil Company Case prohibited
the escape of oil or gas without utilization. It did not restrict
the way in which they were to be utilized. The case of Walls v.
Midland Carbon Co.,99 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1920 dealt with a statute of Wyoming which went
further. The Midland Carbon Company did not permit natural
gas to escape but utilized it in a way which the statute declared
to be "wasteful and extravagant."
The statute of Wyoming provided that:
"The use, consumption, or burning of natural gas taken or
drawn "from any natural gas well or wells, or borings from
9SOhio Oil Co. v. Indiana, (1899) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct 576, 44
L Ed. 729.
99(1920) 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct 118, 65 L. Ed. 276.
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which natural gas is produced for the products where such
natural gas is burned, consumed or otherwise wasted without
the heat therein contained being fully and actually applied and
utilized for other manufacturing purposes or domestic purposes
is hereby declared to be a wasteful and extravagant use of
natural gas and shall be unlawful when such gas well or source
of supply is located within ten miles of any incorporated town
or industrial plant."'
100
Another provision of the act is directed specifically against the
use of natural gas for the purpose of producing carbon without
full utilization of the heat.
The Midland Carbon Company sought in the federal courts to
restrain the attorney general of the state and others from enforc-
ing the statute on the ground that it went, in violation of the
federal constitution, beyond the police power of the state. The
company had built at great cost, before the enactment of the
statute, a factory equipped only for the production of carbon
black. This product is used in the manufacture of printing ink
and for a number of other purposes. It was apparently admitted
that the market price of the carbon black and gasoline-the latter
being extracted from the gas before it was burned to produce
carbon black-from a given amount of gas was higher than the
market price of the gas or its products in any other form. On
the other hand, only 1% pounds of carbon black and Y/0 of a
gallon of gasoline were obtained from the consumption of 1,000
cubic feet of natural gas and the state officers claimed that there
were from 33 to 40 pounds of carbon black in that amount of
gas and that the process of extracting was therefore less than
5% efficient. But there was apparently no known method of
securing a more efficient production. The company produced
about 13,000 pounds of carbon black and 1,600 gallons of gaso-
line daily. The state officers claimed that it was using about
10,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day, that all the wells in the entire
region would be completely depleted in three years, and that by
the enforcement of the statute the two nearby towns would have
a supply of gas for all domestic and industrial purposes for thirty
years.
On this state of facts, shown by affidavits, the Supreme Court
reversed the decree of the United States district court granting
o00A statute of Indiana declaring that "the use of natural gas for
illuminating purposes, in what are known as flambeau lights, is a wasteful
and extravagant use thereof," and prohibiting such use was held consti-
tutional in Townsend v. State, (1897) 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19, 37 L R.
A. 294.
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an interlocutory injunction. The court held, in an opinion written
by Justice McKenna, that the case was within the principle of
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiaia.1°0  Three members of the court-one of
them being Chief Justice White who wrote the opinion in the
Ohio Oil Co. Case--dissented without opinion. The common
principle found in the case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana and Linds-
ley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 02 and which controlled in the
Walls Case was, the court said, that0 3 "the power is exerted to
prohibit an extravagent or wasteful or disproportionate use of
the natural gas of the state."
It is dear, however, that the court in the Walls Case has con-
siderably enlarged the power the state possessed over oil and gas
under the Ohio Oil Co. Case. In contrast with the earlier case,
there was no escape of gas unutilized. In fact from the point of
view of obtaining the highest market price to the owners of the
gas it was utilized to the greatest advantage. But in such utiliza-
tion heat was generated which was not and could not be used.
This the legislature declared to be wasteful and made unlawful
when within ten miles of any incorporated town or industrial
plant. The reason why it was declared wasteful and unlawful
was evidently that in the towns and industrial plants it could be
made use of to greater advantage from the point of vziecw of the
public than in the manufacture of carbon black. The statute can
be justified only as a measure for the conservation, for the sake
of the public, of the resources of the state. It cannot be justified
on the narrow ground of the Ohio Oil Co. Case as a measure for
the protection, for the sake of the collective owners of a common
gas field, of the private property right to reduce to possession.
In fact the court paid no attention to the question whether the gas
field was owned by several or whether the entire field was owned
by one. It paid no attention because evidently it made no differ-
ence. The statute according to the decision was to stand not as
a means of protecting one surface owner against another but as
a measure of conservation of the natural resources of the state.
The question, said the court, is10 4 "whether the legislation is a
legal conservation of the natural resources of the state, or an
103(1900) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729.
102(1911) 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369, Ann. Cas. 1912C
160.
103(1920) 254 U. S. 300, 323, 41 Sup. Ct. 118, 65 L Ed. 276.
104(1920) 254 U. S. 300, 314, 41 Sup. Ct. 118, 65 L. Ed. 276.
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arbitrary interference with private rights." The court further
said :15
"Of the range of the utility of carbon black there can be no
controversy and to this fact the companies give an especial empha-
sis in their averments, supplementary affidavits, and argument.
The fact, however, is but of incidental importance. The determin-
ing consideration is the power of the state over, and its regulation
of, a property in which others besides the companies may have
rights and in which the state has an interest to adjust and pre-
serve, natural gas being one of the resources of the state."
And again the court said :100
"And there is great disproportion between the gas and the
product, and necessarily there was presented to the judgment and
policy of the state a comparison of utilities involved, as well, the
preservation of the natural resources of the state, and the equal
participation in them by the people of the state. And the duration
of this utility was for the consideration of the state, and we do
not think the state was required by the constitution of the United
States to stand idly by while these resources were disproportion-
ately used, or used in such a way that tended to their depletion,
having no power of interference."
T he ten-mile limit was held not to be an unconstitutional dis-
crimination and there is no reason to think from the opinion that
the legislature could not have dispensed entirely with such a limit.
Other states with natural gas fields are attempting to conserve
this natural resource against its manufacture into carbon black.
A case came into the federal district court in Louisiana last year
in which the action of the commissioner of the department of
conservation in refusing to issue a permit to build carbon black
plants was attacked . 7
Another case, Gas Products Co. v. Rankin,0 8 decided subse-
quently to the Walls Case, came up in Montana. This case, also
involving a statutory prohibition of the manufacture of carbon
black, is interesting both for the reason that the court, by a vote
of three to two, came to the opposite conclusion from that reached
in the Walls Case and also for the reason that it illustrates the fact
that the legislative power of the state in relation to its natural
resources, as in other respects, is limited not only by the provi-
105(1920) 254 U. S. 300, 319, 41 Sup. Ct. 118, 65 L. Ed. 276.
'Or(1920) 254 U. S. 300, 324, 41 Sup. Ct., 118, 65 L. Ed. 276.
-
07Harkness v. Trion, (1925) 11 F. (2nd) 386. And see Quinton Relief
Oil & Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, (1924) 101
Okla. 164. 224 Pac. 156.
108(1922) 63 Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993, 24 A. L. R. 294.
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sions of the federal constitution but by those of the state constitu-
tion as well.
The Montana statute attacked was the same as that of Wyom-
ing involved in the Waits Case except that in the former there
was no ten-mile limit. There was no substantial difference in the
character of the facts in the two cases. The omission of the ten-
mild limit would in the opinion of the Montana court apparently
not distinguish'the cases. The two grounds for disagreement with
the Walls Case were (1) a rule of property in Montana as to
natural gas different from that announced by the United States-
Supreme Court and (2) an interpretation of the constitutional
guaranty of due process in the state constitution different from
the interpretation of the same guaranty in the federal constitution.
The first ground, it is submitted is entirely inadequate. The
United States Supreme Court sustained the statute not by a denial
of a property right in gas but by holding that it was subject to the
police power of the state to the extent of the statute. Whether
that property right be called a right to reduce to possession as held
by the United States Supreme Court or a qualified property in the
gas itself as held by the Montana court makes no difference. In
either case there is property which is within the protection of the
due process claises.* The real difference between the two courts
is a difference in the interpretation of due process and behind
that interpretation is the question of policy-whether the power
of the state to control the waste of its natural resources should be
extended beyond the bounds set in the case of Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana,-0 9 that is beyond what is necessary to protect the surface
owners of a common field of gas.
2. As AGAINST THE FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.
We have seen that what power the state has over wild animals
and water may be based, even in relation to interstate commerce,
on its proprietary interest independent of the ordinary exercise of
the police power.' 10
109(1900) 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct 576,'44 L. Ed. 729.
"'OThe case of Sils v. Eesterberg, (1908) 211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. CL
10, 53 L. Ed. 75, was not, of course, based on such interest but it involved
control over ,wild animals brought in from other states and was therefore
not concerned with control over the exportation from the state of its own
resources.
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In relation to natural gas and oil,111 on the other hand, the
state has no proprietary interest and what control it has with
reference to them it has by reason of its ordinary police power.
One of the fundamental purposes of the police power is to
provide for the public safety. A statute of Indiana forbade the
transportation of gas through pipes at a pressure exceeding 300
pounds per square inch and forbade transportation except b)4 the
natural pressure of the gas flowing from the well. The act was
attacked as being an unconstitutional interference with interstate
.commerce in the cases of Jamieson v. Indian Natural Gas and
Oil Co.""' and Benedict v. Columbus Constrwction Co."' It was
contended that the real purpose of the statute was to pro-
hibit the exportation of the gas beyond the state borders. It was
apparently admitted that with pressure limited to 300 pounds at
the well and no artificial pressure in any way permitted, gas could
not be transported in pipes beyond a distance of about sixty miles.
So far as it prohibited a pressure in the pipes in excess of
300 pounds it was held in the Indiana case to be a valid police
regulation, although it indirectly interfered with interstate com-
merce. The court said that natural gas is a dangerous product,
in a high degree inflammable and explosive, and that the effect
upon interstate commerce was only incidental. But the chancellor,
in the New Jersey case, held that the statute in so far as it pro-
hibited the use of artificial pressure up to 300 pounds whether at
the well or at any point in the transportation pipes was an un-
reasonable police measure and was aimed at the prevention of
transportation of the gas to other states and therefore in violation
of the commerce clause of the federal constitution. The court
said" 4 that although the-
"pipes may be of equal strength along their entire line, and
although friction lessens the pressure at the rate of from five to
eight pounds per mile, the statute forbids the doing of anything
to counteract the effect of the friction and maintain the pressure
which the legislature admits is safe and reasonable."' 5
"'The cases which we shall note deal with gas but the principles
doubtless apply to oil also.
112(1891) 128 Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76, 12 L. R. A. 652.
113(1891) 49 N. J. Eq. 23, 23 At. 485.
"
4Benedict v. Columbus Construction Co., (1891) 49 N. J. Eq. 23, 37, 23
Atl. 485.
"'5An entire Kansas statute containing among other things provisions
substantially similar to the Indiana statute was declared unconstitutional
because the general purpose of the statute was to prevent interstate com-
merce in natural gas. Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1912) 224
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The two leading cases on the question of the power of the
state in relation to interstate commerce in natural gas are West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 11.6 and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia.1"
The first case arose out of an attempt by the legislature of
Oklahoma to prevent the exportation of natural gas from the
state. The state prohibited its transportation by pipe lines except
by companies incorporated in accordance with the provisions of
the statute; foreign corporations were forbidden to conduct the
business; no corporation organized in the state for the purpose of
transporting gas within the state was to be granted a charter, or
right of eminent domain, or right to use highways, except it ex-
pressly stipulate in its charter that it shall transport only within
the state and shall not deliver to any one engaged in transporting
beyond the state; pipe lines for natural gas were declared to be
an additional burden upon highways, streets, etc., and the right
of eminent domain restricted to those complying with the purpose
of the act.
The case came to the United States Supreme Court on an
appeal in which the complainants sought to enjoin the attorney
general of the state from enforcing the statute. It was ad-
mitted that the whole purpose of the act was to prevent natural
gas from leaving the state. On behalf of the state it was con-
tended, however, that the "ruling principle" of the lav was con-
servation and that the effect upon interstate commerce must be
regarded as incidental; that the state was exerting its powers to
prevent the depletion of one of its natural resources. The supreme
court of Indiana had declared unconstitutional a statute which at-
tempted to do much more directly what the Oklahoma statute
sought to accomplish." 8 The Supreme Court of the United
States likewise declared invalid the Oklahoma law. 19 The court
looked to the ultimate purpose of the act-the prohibition of inter-
state commerce. The private property right in gas and the absence
of public ownership was reiterated. The point of view of the
U. S. 217, 32 Sup. Ct. 442, 56 L. Ed. 738. This was the statute involved in
the case of West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., which we consider below.
126(1911) 211 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716, 35 L R_ A.
(N.S.) 1193.
"7 (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117, 32 A. I- I
300.
"18 State, ex rel. Corwin v. Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas and Wiming
Co., (1889) 120 Ind. 575, 22 N. E. 778, 6 L. I. A. 579.
"S9Justices Holmes, Lurton, and Hughes dissented.
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court is well expressed in the following words from the opinion
of the court written by Justice McKenna :120
"It [the Oklahoma statute] does not alone regulate the right
of the reduction to possession of the gas, but when the right is
exercised, when the gas becomes property, takes from it the
attributes of property, the right to dispose of it; indeed, selects
its market to reserve it for future purchasers and use within the
state on the ground that the welfare of the state will thereby be
subserved. The results of the contention repel its acceptance.
Gas, when reduced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to
the owner of the land, and, when reduced to possession, is his
individual property, subject to sale by him, and may be a subject
of'intrastate commerce and interstate commerce. The statute of
Oklahoma recognizes it to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but
seeks to prohibit it from being the subject of interstate commerce,
and this is the purpose of its conservation. In other words, the
purpose of its conservation is in a sense commercial-the business
welfare of the state, as coal might be, or timber. Both of these
products may be limited in amount, and the same consideration
of public welfare which would confine gas to the use of the in-
habitants of a state would confine them to the inhabitants of the
state. If the states have such power a singular situation might
result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its tim-
ber, the mining states their minerals. And why may not the
products of the field be brought within the principle ?,,121
The Oklahoma statute was passed in 1907 and the Supreme
Court of the United States declared it invalid four years later.
In 1919 the legislature of West Virginia enacted a statute that
did not go nearly as far. The act sought not to prohibit the use
of the natural gas of the state in other states but sought to give
its own inhabitants the preferred right to purchase the gas before
it left the state. The result of the enforcement of such a statute,
however, would be to decrease the amount of gas which otherwise
120West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 254, 31 Sup.
Ct. 564, 55 L Ed. 716, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1193.
121The entire statute, including those provisions designed to grant the
right of eminent domain and the use of the highways for pipe lines to
those transporting gas within the state and to deny such privileges to
those transporting gas out of the state, was declared invalid because of the
general character and purpose of the law to discriminate against interstate
commerce. And see also Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., (1912) 224
U. S. 217, -32 Sup. Ct. 442, 56 L. Ed. 738.
In case a state does not discriminate against interstate commerce, but
by mere inaction does not grant the right of eminent domain or the use
of its highways to gas pipe lines, the law is not settled as to the rights
of those engaged in interstate commerce. See, in addition to the West and
Haskell cases in the United States Supreme Court, Haskell v. Cowham,
(8th Cir. 1911) 187 Fed. 403, 109 C. C. A. 235; and Consumer's Gas Trust
Co. v. Harless, (1892) 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 1062, 15 L. R. A. 505, and
a note in 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1195.
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would be transported from West Virginia to Pennsylvania and
Ohio. The result was that these two states brought original suits
in the United States supreme court to enjoin the state of West
Virginia from enforcing the act.'
On behalf of West Virginia it was contended that the statute
only iequired that each public service gas company furnish reason-
ably adequate service within reasonable territorial limits and that
the effect on interstate commerce was only indirect and incidental.
The court in an opinion by Justice VanDevanter declared' 3 the
issue to be-
"whether a state wherein natural gas is produced and is a
recognized subject of commercial dealings may require that in its
sale and disposal consumers in that state 'shall be accorded a pre-
ferred right of purchase over consumers in other states,-when
the requirement necessarily will operate to withdraw a large
volume of the gas from an established interstate current whereby
it is supplied in other states to consumers there. Of course, in
the last analysis, the question is whether the enforced withdrawal
for the benefit of local consumers is such an interference with
interstate commerce as is forbidden to a state by the constitu-
tion."
The West Virginia law was declared unconstitutional because
its necessary operation was to obstruct and burden interstate com-
merce in a lawful article of commerce. In regard to the argument
of conservation the court said :124
"Another consideration advanced to the same end is that the
gas is a natural product of the state and has become a necessity
therein, that the supply is waning and no longer sufficient to
satisfy local needs and be used abroad, and that the act is there-
fore a legitimate measure of conservation in the interest of the
people of the state. If the situation be as stated, it affords no
grounds for the assumption by the state of power to regulate
interstate commerce, which is what the act attempts to do. That
power is lodged elsewhere."
Justice Holmes dissented and in an opinion 5 which Justice
Brandeis said seemed to him unanswered stated his reasons. In
his opinion, "the constitution does not prohibit a state from secur-
ing a reasonable preference for its own inhabitants in the enjoy-
ment of its products even when the effect of its law is to keep
property within its boundaries that otherwise would have passed
'22Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct.
658, 32 A. L. R. 300.123hbid., at p. 595.
224Ibid., at p. 598.
125Ibd., at p. 600.
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outside." He went even so far as to say in regard to the argu-
ment that if one state could prevent the exportation of gas
others could keep their coal and timber:
"I confess I do not see what is to hinder. Certainly if the
owners of the mines or the forests saw fit not to export their
products the constitution would not make them do it. I see
nothing in that instrument that would produce a different result
if the state gave the owners motives for their conduct, as by
offering a bonus."
Moreover he said that the state sought to reach natural gas
before it had begun to move in commerce of any kind.
Legally the decisions in the Oklahoma and West Virginia
cases can be distinguished from the Geer and New Jersey
Water Cases because of the difference in the property rights in
wild animals and water on the one hand and gas on the other.
However, in both the Geer and New Jersey Water Cases the court
stated that the same result would be arrived at through the exer-
cise of the police power independent of the proprietary interest of
the state. The majority of the court feels that the principle of
those cases should not be extended to the gas cases. It evidently
fears encroachment upon interstate commerce by the states were
it to hold otherwise. "Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the
Northwest its timber, the mining states their minerals." There-
fore the court has refused to classify gas in its relation to inter-
state commerce with game and water but to regard the latter as
constituting a special class. The commercial importance of gas
and oil is undoubtedly a factor in distinguishing it in the mind
of the court from game and water. In contrast with them, this
is ultimately their only importance and where an article derives
its importance as an article of commerce the supreme court is very
jealous of any attempt on the part of any state to use its power
because the article happens to be in the state to secure advantages
in it at the expense of other states.
SUMMARY
We summarize here the result of our study of the cases on
the power of the state independent of its proprietary interest.
As against alleged private rights as well as against the charge
of interfering with interstate commerce the United States Su-
preme Court has said that the power which we found in our
first installment is usually based on the proprietary interest of
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the state may be based on the police power independent of that
interest. However, regulations concerning game brought in from
other states must be based on the police power alone. The bulk
of this installment deals, however, with those resources-percolat-
ing water, gas, and oil-in which the courts -have held that the
state has no proprietary interest. As against private rights we
find that the great power of the state with reference to these
resources is the prevention of waste. The United States Supreme
Court has broadened the basis of this power to include the pro-
tection of the public interest in the natural resources as well as
the protection of the property interest of the several owners of
the resources -themselves. In relation to interstate commerce the
state has up to the present not been able to make its control effec-
tive. In fact we may safely say that its power over gas and oil is
no greater in relation to interstate commerce than its power over
resources in the state which have a fixed situs, such as coal and
iron ore.
CONCLUSION
Looking to the future what tendencies may we discern in
the decisions of the courts in relation to the power of the state
to control its natural resources which have no fixed situs?
The state has extensive powers where it has a proprietary in-
terest. But the subjects in which it has a proprietary interest are
very limited. They include game and fish and water and there
seems to be no disposition whatever on the part of the courts to
extend the proprietary interest of the state to other subjects. In
understanding the present limits of that interest the historical
reason based on the physical nature of the things themselves is
undoubtedly the most important. The courts found difficulty in
assigning ownership to any one, except the public, in such "fugi-
tive" things. as game, fish, and water, and even in oil and gas.
They were on one person's land now and on another's a moment
later. They also felt that percolating water and gas and oil being
underground were more closely identified with the soil than
game and they therefore denied public ownership in them. How-
ever, we believe that in addition to the physical nature of the
thing its .commercial importance is also a factor in determining
whether the state is to have a proprietary interest in it and es-
pecially the extent of the state's power based upon such interest.
This factor is not mentioned by the courts in their opinions and
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is sometimes obscured by other factors but we think it has had
and will have considerable influence in shaping the law. It is
apparently where the prevailing view is that a thing, such as
game and to a limited extent water, should be reserved chiefly
for other than commercial uses that the courts have been most
ready to recognize to the fullest extent a proprietary interest in
the state. It is to be noted too that as a rule the proprietary in-
terest of the state has been confined to those things which have
not been, comparatively, of great commercial importance. Cer-
tain fisheries-such as oysters-are, it is true, of great commer-
cial importance. But has not their commercial importance had
something to do with the recognition to some extent of private
rights in connection with them? Private ownership, for example,
may be had in shell fish without reduction to possession and the
right to fish, as a property right independent of ownership in the
fish themselves, may also be acquired. 120 The commercial impor-
tance of gas and oil may not have been the chief reason for
denying to the state a proprietary interest in them but we think it
may have been one reason for distinguishing them from animals
ferae naturae in that respect.' 27 Again it may have had a part in
the decision in the cases1 25 which have denied to the state the
power to prevent the shipment of oysters and shrimps-things
in which the state admittedly has a proprietary interest-for
canning and packing outside of the state. And if other courts
besides that of Nebraska 1 29 pass upon the question of the power
of the state to attach a condition to a permit to use water for
generating power that the power produced shall not be trans-
mitted beyond the state borders, it will be one influence tending
to lead them to an opposite conclusion.
Apart from the effect the commercial importance of shell-
fish and water power may have upon the power of the state
to control interstate commerce in them, the cases in reference
to them have another common feature. The state in these cases
sought, by means of its undoubted power over those things in
which it has a proprietary interest, to attach conditions to their
use which interfered with interstate commerce. Shellfish could
120Fish and Fisheries, secs. 4 and 6, 11 R. C. L. pp. 1017, 1021.
127See p. 248, supra.
128State v. Ferrandau, (1912) 130 La. 1035, 58 So. 870, Ann. Cas.
1913D 1170; Elmer v. Wallace, (D.C. Ala., 1921) 275 Fed. 86.
129Kirk v. State Board of Irrigation, (1912) 90 Neb. 627, 134 N. W.
167.
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be exported but not for canning and packing. Water could be
used but the power generated could not leave the state. If the
state could entirely prohibit the exportation of shellfish why
might it not prohibit their exportation for canning and packing?
If the state could prohibit the use or exportation of water why
might it not prohibit the exportation of power generated from
that water?
The Louisiana case and the case in the federal district court-
the shellfish cases--emphasize two facts: (1) that the state had
recognized the fish as an article of interstate commerce and then
presumed to regulate that commerce; (2) that the purpose was
not conservation but the building up of a collateral industry. The
Nebraska case held the limitation on the use of the water valid.
The prohibition on the transmission of the water power outside of
the state was absolute. But such prohibition did not have for its
purpose the conservation of the water itself. And the state has
no proprietary interest in the water power. It has no more pro-
prietary interest in the water power than it has in goods manufac-
tured by the aid of that power. No one perhaps would contend
that the state could exercise its power over the use of water to the
extent of prohibiting the exportation of such goods. Yet, if the
state can permit the use of the water with a condition or deny its
use, why not? Of course other factors besides the use of the
water enter into the manufacture of the goods but other factors
besides the water are also needed to generate the power.
The general question in these cases is: Can the state discrim-
inate against interstate commerce by using its power to protect
and conserve for its own inhabitants things in which it has a pro-
prietary interest as a means merely to secure advantages in col-
lateral things in which it has no proprietary interest? The
Supreme Court of the United States has not answered that ques-
tion. If it answers the question in the negative we may expect it
to use the analogy of those cases where it looks to the purpose of
the legislature to determine its power. In Haimicr v. Dagen-
huart,130 for example, it denied to Congress the power to regulate
commerce when the purpose was to use the regulation as a means
of discouraging the use of child labor in manufacturing. And the
court has denied to the state the use of its power to exclude for-
eign corporations when the purpose is to interfere with interstate
commerce. 31
130(1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101.
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In relation to those things in which it has no proprietary in-
terest we have already noted the great power of the state is the
prevention of waste and we have also noted with reference to
interstate commerce in such things that little latitude is ap-
parently left the state after the decision in the case of Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia.13s A sentence in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Holmes in that case suggests, however, a question that
will perhaps sooner or later come up to the supreme court for
decision. These are the words of Justice Holmes:"'3
"The right of the state so to regulate the use of natural gas
as to prevent waste was sustained as against the fourteenth
amendment in Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., . . . and I do not
suppose that the plaintiffs would have fared any better had they
invoked the commerce clause."
Suppose that a company such as the Midland Carbon Co.,
in order to avoid the prohibitions of the Wyoming statute trans-
ports gas across the line into Montana where such prohibitions
have been declared invalid by the state court and from the gas
so transported manufactures carbon black. Would it thereby
under the decision in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia avoid the
penalties of the Wyoming statute, sustained in the Walls Case,
which prohibits the use, sale, or other distribution of natural gas
for the purpose of manufacturing carbon without the heat being
fully utilized? The Wyoming statute does not attempt to dis-
criminate in favor of the inhabitants of the state but is designed
to operate on intrastate and interstate commerce alike. On the
other hand the purpose of the West Virginia statute declared
invalid in Pennsylvania v. West -Virginia was to secure a pref-
erence to the inhabitants of the state.
The United States Supreme Court'3 4 has sustained a statute
of Florida which forbade the sale or shipment of any citrus
fruits which were immature or otherwise unfit for consumption.
The court took judicial notice that the raising of citrus fruits was
one of the great industries of Florida and declared that it was
competent for the state through its police power to protect the
success of that industry by preserving its reputation where the
1aiWestern Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, (1910) 216 U. S. 1, 30
Sup. Ct. 190, 54 1- Ed. 355.
132Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct.
658, 67 L. Ed. 1117, 32 A. L. R. 300.
133Ibid., at p. 601.
'34Sligh v. Kirkwood, (1915) 237 U. S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed.
STATE CONTROL OF NATURAL RESOURCES
fruits were sold. The statute applied to both intrastate and
interstate commerce but did not discriminate against the latter.
The court said :135
"Nor does it make any difference that such regulations inci-
dentally affect interstate commerce, when the object of the regu-
lation is not to that end, but is a legitimate attempt to protect
the people of the state. . . So it may be taken as established
that the mere fact that interstate commerce is indirectly affected
will not prevent the state from exercising its police power, at
least until Congress, in the exercise of its supreme authority,
regulates the subject. Furthermore, this regulation cannot be
declared invalid if within the range of the police power, unless
it can be said that it has no reasonable relation to a legitimate
purpose to be accomplished in its enactment; and whether such
regulation is necessary in the public interest is primarily within
the determination of the legislature, assuming the matter to be
a proper subject of state regulation."
Does not the principle of Sligh v. Kirkwood1' make the
power of the state over the utilization of gas sustained in the
Walls Case applicable even where the gas is destined for inter-
state commerce? That the prohibition of the Florida statute is
based on the condition of the article while that of the Wyoming
statute is based on the purpose for which it is to be used would
seem to be immaterial. Each state is attempting to protect a local
interest-in the one case against damage to the reputation of an
industry, in the other against the waste of a natural resource. In
each case we have a "legitimate attempt to protect the people of
the state," and by regulations that only "incidentally affect inter-
state commerce."
'
35lbid., at p. 60.
135(1915) 237 U. S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 59 L. Ed. 835.
